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THE (UNCERTAIN) FUTURE OF ONLINE DATA
PRIVACY1
by
DAN JERKER B. SVANTESSON*
In this article I will address a somewhat eclectic selection of data privacy topics that
I think are of particular significance, including:
• Some international developments in the data privacy law area;
• Extraterritoriality issues including the ‘jurisdictional lasagne’;
• The recently decided Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) case
on the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’;
• ‘Big Data’ and the Internet of Things; and
• The concept of ‘consent’.
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1.  THERE  IS  ACTUALLY  A  DATA  PRIVACY  WORLD
BEYOND EUROPE...
The reality is that, in the data privacy arena, there is so much going on just
in Europe that the task of looking beyond Europe is often unrealistic  for
Europeans. Yet, I think it is extremely important that Europe does indeed
look at what goes on in data privacy in the rest of the world. If that is done,
it will not only give a better understanding of relevant foreign law, it may
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also make Europe reconsider some of the approaches taken in the proposed
Regulation. As noted by Bogdan (2005):
Foreign law can play an important role for law students … in
order to give them a better understanding of their own legal
system. … The students begin to see their  own legal system
from a new point  of  view and with a certain distance;  they
realize  there  is  nothing  God-given  about  its  rules.  For  this
purpose, substantive foreign law should be taught within the
framework of all regular courses, even if only by way of a few
well-chosen  examples  rather  than  in  a  consistent  and
comprehensive way.
This is  as true for data privacy European law makers as it  is  for law
students.
European interest in data privacy beyond Europe seems to have been
largely limited to what goes on in the US. This may be natural given the
degree of transatlantic controversy that has stemmed from the data privacy
field.  However,  Greenleaf  (2014,  p.  493),  who  has  carried  out  extensive
research into data privacy laws around the globe, has shown that by mid-
2014, 103 countries across the world had enacted national data privacy laws.
With 50 of those countries being outside Europe, soon there will be more
non-European countries with data protection laws than there are European
countries with such laws. And in light of this, Greenleaf (2014, p. 493) is of
course correct  in  pointing  out  that  innovation  in  data  privacy law is  no
longer just coming from Europe. 
This  is  important  to  remember.  Europe  has  and  will  have  the  most
advanced data protection law in the world, but that does not mean that all
aspects of foreign law are inferior or on a lower level than what we find in
Europe. Thus, compliance with EU law does not guarantee compliance with
all foreign laws.
Further,  for  Europe to  continue  to play  a  central  role  in  shaping  the
global balancing between data privacy and competing interests, Europeans
will have to take greater steps to familiarise themselves with data privacy
developments outside of Europe and the US.
Doing  so  will  also  be  in  the  interest  of  European business.  After  all,
European data privacy law is not alone in its approach to extraterritoriality.
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In fact, while exceptions can be found (e.g. current Japanese data privacy
law), there is a tendency of data privacy laws around the world to adopt an
extraterritorial  scope  so  that  European  businesses  doing  business  in
Australia  or  Singapore  will  be  bound  to  abide  by  Australian  and
Singaporean data privacy law (Svantesson 2013a).
In this context, it is also worth recalling that some non-European data
privacy laws make possible the awarding of heavy penalties. For example,
Trinidad and Tobago’s Data Protection Act 2011 imposes fines up to 10% of
the offending party’s annual turnover (s. 69).2 In light of this, the wisdom of
justifying  breaches  of  the  law  by  reference  to  the  obvious  enforcement
difficulties may be called into question.
2.  … BUT DATA PRIVACY LAW IS MISSING IN MANY
PARTS OF THE WORLD
So far my focus has been on highlighting that there is also a data privacy
landscape  outside  Europe.  Yet,  it  may  be  equally  important  to  remind
Europeans of how well protected their data privacy is compared to in many
other parts of the world. Put in the fewest words, Europeans can be seen to
be spoilt when it comes to data privacy protection. While Europe debates
the  bubbles  in  its  ‘privacy  champagne’,  large  parts  of  the  world  are
desperately hoping to get access to ‘privacy water’. Perhaps it is the luxury
of  having  such  strong  data  privacy  protection  that  has  prompted many
academics in Europe to be critical of data privacy as such?
At any rate, all this may be worth remembering when one is debating
the proposed data privacy Regulation. I am afraid too many European are
too quick to dismiss the whole idea of data protection and calling privacy
dead – someone cleverly describing privacy as a zombie (Koops 2014, p.
259):  it  is  dead it  just  doesn't  know it  yet.  But  privacy is  a  fundamental
human right even if it is hard to protect and enforce in today’s information
society. 
3.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY  –  THE  MOST  IMPORTANT
DATA PRIVACY ISSUE
So what provision of the proposed EU data privacy Regulation would a
non-EU  business  be  most  interested  in?  Well  it  is  certainly  not  the
2 For more information about  this  Act,  see:  Edmund D Christo 2013,  ‘Data Protection  in
Trinidad and Tobago’, International Data Privacy Law, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 202-9.
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requirement of a Data Protection Officer,  and it  is  not even the so-called
right to be forgotten that has gained so much attention lately. The provision
of the proposed EU data privacy Regulation that is of the most interest for a
non-EU business is of course Article 3, which outlines the extent to which
the Regulation applies  to  businesses  located outside  the EU. Here I  will
devote  some  effort  to  analysing  the  Regulation’s  approach  to
extraterritoriality. But first it is interesting to consider what policy goal the
EU is pursuing through the approach it has taken. 
In  a  speech  on  4  March  2014,  European  Commission  Vice-President
Viviane Reding stated:
On territorial scope I recall the broad support that was voiced
for making sure that non-European companies, when offering
services  to  European  consumers,  apply  the  same  rules  and
adhere  to  the  same  levels  of  protection  of  personal  data  as
European companies.  This  is  about  creating a  level  playing-
field between European and non-European businesses. About
fair competition in a globalised world.
This  argument  does  not  lack  merit.  However,  the  idea  that  the
Regulation’s wide reach creates a ‘fair competition in a globalised world’ is
questionable. In fact, complying with the complex EU data privacy law is
likely to be prohibitively expensive for small  and medium sized non-EU
businesses interacting in  the European market on an irregular basis.  The
result will be that only large foreign businesses, and foreign businesses that
do not care about complying with EU law, will be able to afford to enter the
European market.
3.1 AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED ARTICLE 3
Despite  being  so  important,  Article  3  –  determining  the  proposed
Regulation’s territorial scope – has received limited attention. 
In the form it was presented by the Commission (Proposal 2012), Article
3 reads as follows:
Article 3:
1. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in
the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller
or a processor in the Union.
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2. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of
data  subjects  residing  in  the  Union  by  a  controller  not
established in  the Union,  where the processing activities  are
related to:
(a)  the  offering  of  goods  or  services  to  such  data  subjects  in  the
Union; or
(b) the monitoring of their behaviour.
3. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data by
a controller not established in the Union, but in a place where
the national law of a Member State applies by virtue of public
international law. (emphasis added)
Anyone attempting to get clarification as to the exact meaning of this
Article,  and the  underlying  principles  that  has  guided  the  drafters,  will
logically turn to the Explanatory Memorandum. Unfortunately, doing so is
an utter waste of time. Depending on one’s personal disposition, one will be
either amused, dumbfounded or feel great despair in finding that under the
heading ‘3.4 Detailed explanation of the proposal’, all that the Explanatory
Memorandum  states  about  Article  3  is  that:  ‘Article  3  determines  the
territorial scope of the Regulation.’ If this is the ‘detailed explanation of the
proposal’, we need the drafters to provide a ‘super-extended director’s cut’
version as well.
This lacking attention to a key provision, that more than any other needs
to be discussed in detail, is puzzling. What is worse, even on a charitable
interpretation of the situation, the failure to provide reasonable guidance as
to Article 3 is negligent, arguably suggesting that inadequate attention has
been given to the territorial scope of the Regulation. At worst, it seems the
drafters  are seeking to avoid attention being directed at  the enormously
important effect of Article 3.
Interestingly, and no doubt controversially, whichever version of Article
3  is  finally  entering  into  force,  this  provision  seems  likely  to  bring  all
providers of Internet services such as websites, social networking services
and app providers under the scope of the EU Regulation as soon as they
interact with data subjects residing in the European Union. While this can
be  said  to  be  the  case  already  under  the  current  EU  approach  to
extraterritoriality,  it  is  submitted that the new approach,  as found in the
proposed Regulation, goes even further.
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In more detail,  the rule articulated in Article 3(2)(a) contains a double
requirement; that is, (1) the data subject must reside in the European Union
(similar to passive nationality), and (2) the conduct must take place in the
EU (similar to objective territoriality). However, Article 3(2)(b), which must
be  read  independently  from  Article  3(2)(a),  only  contains  the  first
requirement – it  only focuses  on whether the data subject  resides  in  the
European Union.
If this is correct, then Article 3(2)(b) suggests that EU residents enjoy the
protection of the Regulation simply by residing in the European Union. In
the absence of further restrictions, this protection would then seem to attach
to the very  person of EU residents  so as  to  enable  them to rely on this
protection also when traveling outside the EU. For example, an EU resident
on holiday  in  New York would be protected by the  EU data protection
Regulation by virtue of EU residence if a US controller, not established in
the Union, processes personal data of the EU resident as part of monitoring
the EU resident’s behaviour in New York.
This result is so absurd, and so clearly inappropriate, that it cannot have
been  the  drafters’  intention.  Thus,  the  proposed  Regulation  must  be
amended to address this issue, and indeed, all that is required to address
this particular issue is to include, in Article 3(2)(b), the words ‘in the Union’
in the manner done in Article 3(2)(a).
Indeed, some experts seem to take such an amendment to Article 3(2)(b)
for  granted.  In  expressing  his  views  on  the  proposed  Regulation,  the
European Data Protection Supervisor (2012, p. 17) stated that:
[h]e  considers  that the offering of goods and services  or  the
monitoring of  the  behaviour of  data  subjects  in the  Union makes
much more sense and is more in line with the reality of global
exchanges of information than the existing criterion of the use
of  equipment  in  the  EU,  under  Article  4(1)(c)  of  Directive
95/46/EC. (emphasis added)
While this interpretation is sensible, it would be much more comfortable
to  have  the  text  of  Article  3(2)(b)  amended  so  as  to  cement  this
interpretation beyond any doubt.
When the  European Parliament  had its  say  on  how the  Regulation’s
scope of application is to be delineated, it did indeed address the problem I
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pointed to above. The European Parliament’s (European Commission 2014,
p. 6) version of Article 3 reads as follows:
Article 3: Territorial Scope
1. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data in
the context of the activities of an establishment of a controller
or a processor in the Union, whether the processing takes place
in the Union or not.
2. This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data of
data  subjects  in  the  Union  by  a  controller  or  processor  not
established in  the Union,  where the processing activities  are
related to:
(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a
payment of the data subject is required, to such data subjects in
the Union; or
(b) the monitoring of such data subjects.
While  they  consequently  have  addressed  the  issue  above,  they  have
done so in a manner creating another equally, or at least almost equally,
serious issue – it is not clear whether the words ‘in the Union’ in Article 3(2)
relate to ‘data subjects’ or ‘processing’.
The  latter  alternative  is  perhaps  preferable  compared  to  the  former.
However, if Article 3(2) is meant to regulate the processing taking place ‘in
the  Union’  by  a  controller  or  processor  not  established  in  the  Union,
significantly more guidance is desirable than what we have received so far.
As noted, the alternative that ‘in the Union’ in Article 3(2) relates to the
location of the ‘data subjects’ is plausible. That would mean that the original
proposal’s  limitation  to  ‘data  subjects  residing  in  the  Union’  has  been
replaced by a location-focused test.  In the absence of further  limitations,
such an approach would seem to bring the Regulation’s Article 3 back into
the realm of absurdity.
Imagine that a US citizen while in the US signs up for a particular US-
based  web  service  which  places  cookies  on  that  person’s  browser  in  a
manner that can be seen as ‘monitoring’ the user. As long as that US citizen
remains in the US, no drama arises. However, should that person get on a
flight, like many people do these days, and travel to Berlin, Stockholm or
some other beautiful place in Europe, then the US web service is suddenly
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bound by the European Regulation as soon as that person starts browsing
the web. After all, (1) the US company is clearly a ‘controller or processor
not  established in  the Union’,  (2)  the US citizen is  a data subject ‘in  the
Union’ after stepping off the plane in Europe and (3) once she or he starts
surfing the web, she/he is ‘monitored’.
The scenario described is not fanciful or unusual, and has nothing to do
with  creating  a  ‘level-playing  field’  –  the  key  aim  of  the  Regulation’s
extraterritorial scope. In fact, it demonstrates that, on this interpretation, the
Regulation will  have an enormously wide scope of application given the
mobility associated with modern society – any organisation that reasonably
expects  to  engage  with  their  customers  while  those  customers  travel  to
Europe must seriously consider their position under the Regulation.
The latest installment, at the time of writing, is the Council’s proposal
(European Parliament 2014). The relevant part reads as follows:
3.2 This Regulation applies to the processing of personal data
of  data  subjects  residing  in  the  Union  by  a  controller  not
established in  the Union,  where the processing activities  are
related to: 
(a) the offering of goods or services, irrespective of whether a
payment by the data subject is required, to such data subjects
in the Union; or 
(b) the monitoring of their behaviour as far as their behaviour
takes place within the European Union.
This is no doubt the best of the three proposals discussed here. Yet, I am
afraid  that  this  solution  also  falls  well  short  of  what  is  acceptable.  To
understand why, it is useful to look in more detail at how the Council of the
European Union (2014, para. 20) sees this provision work in practise:
In  order  to  determine  whether  such  a  controller  is  offering
goods or services to such data subjects in the Union, it should
be  ascertained  whether  it  is  apparent  that  the  controller  is
envisaging doing business with data subjects residing in one or
more  Member  States  in  the  Union.  Whereas  the  mere
accessibility of the controller’s or an intermediary’s website in
the Union or of an email address and of other contact details or
the use of a language generally used in the third country where
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the  controller  is  established,  is  insufficient  to  ascertain  such
intention, factors such as the use of a language or a currency
generally  used  in  one  or  more  Member  States  with  the
possibility  of  ordering  goods  and  services  in  that  other
language,  and/or  the  mentioning  of  customers  or  users
residing in the Union, may make it apparent that the controller
envisages offering goods or services to such data subjects in the
Union (…).
From this, it is clear that the Council is hoping to leverage the ‘targeting’
approach that has been developed in relation to consumer protection law in
Europe, not least through the decision in the joined cases Pammer v. Reederei
Karl Schlüter GmbH & KG11 and  Hotel Alpenhof GesmbH v. Oliver Heller  (C
585/08 & C 144/09, judgment of 7 December 2010). 
Drawing  upon  legal  solutions  from  other  fields  is  sensible,  and
consumer protection law shares several key features with data privacy law.
So far so good. And in addition, several commentators of the highest caliber
have been endorsing the ‘targeting’ approach. For example, in Making Laws
for Cyberspace, Reed (2012, p. 225) states that: 
a seller who targets the consumers of a particular state online
has clearly joined, albeit temporarily, the trading community of
that state. Because of this, the trader is likely to recognize the
authority  of  that  state’s  lawmaker  over  its  transactions,  and
thus to grant the necessary protection voluntarily. 
The problem is that the targeting approach, at least as applied by the
Advocate General and the Court in Pammer/Hotel Alpenhof, is misguided in
that it focuses on the subjective intentions of the relevant party.
Both the Advocate General and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) seem
to take the view that the phrase ‘directs such activities’ implies a conscious
decision executed without mistakes. The Advocate General (2010, para. 63)
states: ‘It is therefore essential for there to be active conduct on the part of
the undertaking, the objective and outcome of which is to win customers
from other Member States.’
While I agree that there must be some active conduct on the part of the
undertaking, the problem with this approach is found in the words in italic.
We can  have  a  situation  in  which  the  objective  of  an  activity  is  to  win
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customers from other Member States, but no such outcome is realised. And
we  can  have  a  situation  in  which  the  outcome of  an  activity  is  to  win
customers from other Member States, without it being the trader’s objective.
Imagine the following scenario that I (2011, p. 301) have used elsewhere to
illustrate this point. 
A trader in Greece wishes to carry out an extensive marketing campaign
in  Switzerland,  but  miscommunicates  its  wishes  so  that  the  marketing
company it has hired is under the impression that the country to be targeted
is Sweden. The result is that every Swedish household receives marketing
materials from the Greek business, and the Greek business accepts a large
number of orders from consumers in Sweden. In such a scenario, the Greek
business has never made a conscious decision to direct its activities to the
consumers in Sweden. Similarly, it would be incorrect to say that the Greek
business envisaged doing business with consumers domiciled in Sweden, in
the sense that it was minded to conclude a contract with them prior to any
contracts were entered into. Put simply, it was never the Greek business’
objective to win customers from Sweden.
Applying the standard set by the ECJ, and promoted by the Advocate
General,  the Swedish consumers would then not be protected by Article
15(1)(c) of the Brussels I Regulation. Surely this cannot be in line with the
intent of the drafters of the Regulation? And surely this is not the type of
approach we would like to see adopted for the data privacy Regulation?
The better  approach is  to  distinguish  between objective  and outcome
and only focus on the outcome when determining whether the business has
directed its activities to the consumer’s state. Such a move from subjectivity
to objectivity promotes certainty and fairness. 
In the end, however, even with this improvement it is doubtful that the
targeting approach will be able to produce good results in the data privacy
setting where many instances  of data collection and processing will  lack
reference to the factors, such as currency, meant to determine whether the
party targeted Europe or not. Targeting is appealing in theory, but in action
on the ground it is likely to be rather useless; it will provide no certainty for
the  parties  involved,  and for  a  large  number  of  parties  involved in  the
handling of personal data, courts are going to have to conclude either that
they target just about every country in the world or no countries at all. Both
of these options will render the targeting approach useless.
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3.2 JURISDICTIONAL LASAGNE TO THE RESCUE
The approach taken to extraterritoriality, both in the current data privacy
Directive and in all versions of the proposed Regulation, is binary. All or
nothing. If a non-EU business or organisation meets the ‘extraterritoriality
test’, it is bound by the full force of the Regulation.
This unsophisticated approach is problematic. It simply does not make
sense to apply the same standard of extraterritoriality to provisions such as
Article 5 (requiring e.g. that personal data is processed lawfully, fairly and
in a transparent manner), and to Article 35 (demanding the designation of a
potentially costly data protection officer). While it may be reasonable to ask
a foreign company to abide by a country’s rules discouraging or penalising
unauthorised  and unreasonable  disclosure  or  other  use  of  personal  data
based on a certain degree of contact between that company and that country
(e.g.  a  transaction  involving  the  collection  of  personal  data),  the  same
degree of contact may not justify that country imposing on the company the
duty of designating a data protection officer. The first type of rule is similar
in nature to rules found in other areas of law, such as the law of defamation.
In a sense, they are private in nature, while rules such as e.g. requiring a
data protection officer  are of a,  comparatively heavy-handed, public  law
nature.
In an article published in International Data Privacy Law, I (2013b) have
put  forward  a  proposal  for  an  alternative  approach  to  delineating  the
extraterritorial scope of data privacy laws. I will  here summarise the key
points of that approach.
• Data privacy laws always incorporate a diverse range of legal rules.
Thus,  it  is  misguided  and  naive  to  think  that  the  same  rule  of
extraterritoriality can be applied to all these types of rules.
• Thus, I propose that we dissect our data privacy law and assign all
substantive rules to one of the following three ‘layers’:
1. The abuse-prevention layer;
2. The rights layer; and
3. The administrative layer.
• As already noted, data privacy laws commonly contain provisions
seeking  to  discourage  or  even  penalise  unauthorised  and
unreasonable disclosure or other use of personal data, in a manner
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similar  to how e.g. defamation law seeks to prevent abuse.  Such
rules ought to clearly fall within the abuse-prevention layer.
• Within the rights layer we can comfortably place data privacy rules
such as the right of access  and the right of correction commonly
found in data privacy laws.
• As already hinted at, in the administrative layer, we should place
data privacy rules such as the requirements of a designated data
protection  officer  found  in  the  proposed  EU  data  privacy
Regulation.
• We can then assign a different  extraterritorial  test  for each layer,
with a more restrictive test for layer two than for layer one, and
even more restrictive test for layer three.
Experience  has  taught  us  that  the  current  approaches  to
extraterritoriality  in  data  privacy  law  simply  do  not  work.  They  are
clumsily managing to be both overzealous and inadequate at the same time.
Thus,  this  conundrum must  be solved through the  development  of  new
approaches,  such  as  the  ‘layered  approach’,  or  ‘jurisdictional  lasagne’,
advocated above.
3.3 CONCLUDING REMARKS REGARDING 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN DATA PRIVACY LAW
The above ought to have made clear that,  in my view, the overly broad
extraterritorial  reach  of  the  proposed  EU  data  privacy  Regulation  is
undesirable and destructive. In fact, I would not be surprised if it leads to
reactions  similar  to  what  we  have  seen  in  the  context  of  cross-border
defamation law and cross-border anti-competition law where the result has
included defensive actions such as:
1. Laws that prohibit the giving of evidence and the production
of documents in foreign proceedings;
2.  Laws  that  aims  to  block  or  prevent  the  enforcement  of
foreign judgments;
3.  Laws  prohibiting  compliance  with  orders  of  foreign
authorities; and
4. ‘Claw-back’ laws.
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The resulting landscape will  be messy indeed and to the detriment of
data subjects, data processors and data controllers.
4. THE SO-CALLED ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’
While it is my view that the so-called ‘right to be forgotten’ has gained more
attention than it deserves, the temptation to make some observations about
this ‘right’ is too great to be resisted. And indeed as I will show below, due
to some ill-conceived Guidelines by the Article 29 Data Protection Working
Party on the proper application of the right to be forgotten, the Google Spain
SL,  Google  Inc.  v.  Agencia  Española  de  Protección  de  Datos  (AEPD),  Mario
Costeja González (2014) Case C-131/12 has unfortunately taken a turn making
it impossible to ignore when dealing with extraterritoriality in data privacy
law.
The  Google  Spain case  requires  no  introduction,  but  in  the  briefest  of
terms: when Spanish citizen Mr Mario Costeja González found links to two,
for him, unflattering pages of the Spanish newspaper  La Vanguardia from
1998,  he  requested that  the  newspaper  remove the  personal  information
about him contained in the relevant pages. He also requested that Google
Spain and Google Inc remove or conceal the personal data relating to him so
that the data no longer appeared in the search results and in the links to La
Vanguardia.
The  matter  ended  up  before  the  Spanish  data  protection  authority
Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD). The AEPD rejected the
complaint against La Vanguardia. At the same time, it upheld the complaint
against Google.
Google  brought  the  matter  before  the  Spanish  National  High  Court
(Audiencia  Nacional),  and that  court  referred the matter to the Court  of
Justice of the European Union.
The CJEU’s decision is legally technical, and many of the legal questions
dealt with are specific to the European Union. However, the consequences
of  the  decision  are  global.  For  example,  the  Court  discussed  in  detail
whether  the  functions  carried  out  by  Google  Search  amounted  to  data
‘processing’, and whether Google was a data ‘controller’ under the relevant
EU law.
The Court answering both these questions in the affirmative meant that
Google was responsible for its search results completely independently of
the possible liabilities of the publishers, such as the newspaper in this case.
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This means that even if certain content, such as the newspaper reporting
relating to Mr Mario Costeja González,  can lawfully  be uploaded to the
Internet,  it  may be unlawful  for Google to list  such content in  its  search
results.
For the EU, there are practical advantages in such an approach. It means
that, by controlling the search engines, it can affect at least the likelihood of
personal  information  being  found  online  even where  the  information  is
provided by a party located outside the EU.
While in line with the approaches taken in the United States, its long-
term implications for the Internet may be severely limiting.
4.1 THE POWER OF LABELS
The first thing that strikes me as odd about the right to be forgotten is how a
well chosen expression may capture our imagination. ‘Cloud computing’,
‘big data’ and the ‘right to be forgotten’ are all examples of phenomena that
existed prior to, but came to life through, the catchy labels we attached to
them. Am I the only one worried by this? Isn’t there something odd about
the idea that the focus of legal, and other, researchers is so strongly guided
by something as flimsy as catchy labels?
Fortunately, a catchy label alone may perhaps not be enough; something
else may be needed.  Looking at  the development of research relating to
‘cloud computing’, ‘Big Data’ and the ‘right to be forgotten’, it seems to me
that where we have a strongly developing phenomenon (SDP) and a catchy
label (CL) describing that phenomenon, we are guaranteed to see significant
research interest (SRI):
SDP + CL = SRI
Perhaps keeping this simple formula in mind may assist us in predicting
‘the next big thing’?
It is also interesting to consider how strongly the mental pictures painted
by the labels guide our thinking. Labels such as ‘going online’, ‘visiting a
website’ and the ‘web’ have all had an impact on how the law, and legal
researchers, approach the underlying phenomena – our thinking is shaped
by labels chosen perhaps rather arbitrarily and without legal consequences
in mind. Also this worries me, and perhaps the time has come to be more
careful in this regard.
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Below I will argue that the recent judgment of the Court of Justice of the
European Union in  Google Spain cannot be seen to articulate a ‘right to be
forgotten’ but rather a (selective) ‘duty to be forgetful’. This difference is not
merely a matter of phrasing.
4.2 A ‘RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN’ OR A (SELECTIVE) ‘DUTY TO BE
FORGETFUL’?
The  ‘right  to  be  forgotten’  has  attracted  considerable  attention  for  some
years now both in legal circles and in media. And as is well-known, much,
perhaps too much, of the focus of the undergoing reform work of the EU
data privacy framework has been devoted to this right.
The relevant legal landscape in Europe has been largely unaltered since
the Data Protection Directive (Directive 95/46) was introduced in the mid-
90s.  So  the  thought  that  the  current  debate  influenced  the  CJEU’s
willingness to embrace a right to be forgotten in Google Spain is inescapable.
At  any  rate,  even  if  the  Court  spoke  expressly  about  a  right  to  be
forgotten,  it  seems to me that  that  was not  what  they delivered in  their
judgment. The court order is  not focused on any such right.  If it  was,  it
would have required the original publisher (La Vanguardia) to remove the
content as well, but it did not.
The real effect of the judgment is to impose a ‘duty to be forgetful’ onto
certain Internet actors – in this case search engines, or indeed, one particular
search engine.
So does this matter? I think it does. First of all, politically, it is of course
always easier to ‘sell’ a right than it is to sell a duty. And second, as was
referred to  more  generally  above,  the  labels  guide,  or  even control,  our
thinking to a large extent.
4.3 WHO WILL STAND UP FOR FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION?
The Court concluded that, where search results appear to be inadequate,
irrelevant  or  no  longer  relevant,  or  excessive,  the  information  and links
concerned in the list of results must be erased. This applies even where the
information is true and published lawfully by third parties. In other words,
the Court places on Google the burden of deciding whether search results
have become outdated.
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In response to the decision, search engines such as Google and Bing have
set up facilities  allowing people to request  the removal of  certain search
results. Large numbers of people have taken up this option.
The  latest  reported  figures  from  Google  show  the  search  giant  has
received more than 174,000 requests on 602,000 links, of which 41.5% have
been removed from European search results following evaluation (Kelion
2014).
The practical difficulties with this blocking are obvious. First of all, there
is the risk of search engines erring on the side of caution and removing any
content complained of. After all, the risks of not removing the content may
easily outweigh any perceived advantage of keeping the content accessible.
Second, content may be seen to be outdated and irrelevant on one date only
to become highly relevant again at a later date.
For example, information about a person’s conduct may be seen to be
outdated one day but become relevant again at a later date if that conduct is
repeated. In other words, the relevance of information is not static – it is
constantly changing and is always dependent on context.
Imagine that a person kills someone, then serves time in jail and upon
release requests blocking of information relating to the murder. If that same
person kills again,  the old blocked reporting of the first  murder must be
seen as relevant again, but who will take on the role of ensuring that it is
unblocked?
In any case, the Court’s conclusion on the right to be forgotten will no
doubt reverberate across the world. Indeed, it forces the creation of a more
forgetful Internet.
From a privacy perspective this must  be seen as a victory. But at the
same time,  privacy interests must  always be balanced against  competing
interests such as freedom of information. The Court (Google Spain SL, Google
Inc. v. Agencia Española de Protección de Datos (AEPD), Mario Costeja González
(2014) Case C-131/12 at para. 100) acknowledged this and stated that, while
the right to be forgotten ordinarily trumps competing interests such as the
economic  interest  of  the  search  engine  operator  and  the  interest  of  the
general  public  in  finding  information upon a search relating to the data
subject’s name:
That  would  not  be  the  case  if  it  appeared,  for  particular
reasons, such as the role played by the data subject in public
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life,  that  the  interference  with  his  fundamental  rights  is
justified by the preponderant interest of the general public in
having, on account of inclusion in the list of results, access to
the information in question.
The question is of course how this assessment will work in practice.
4.4 THE EXTRATERRITORIAL DIMENSION OF THE ‘RIGHT TO BE
FORGOTTEN’
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’s Guidelines (2014) regarding
the Google Spain decision emphasise that:
[i]n  order  to  give  full  effect  to  the  data  subject’s  rights  as
defined  in  the  Court’s  ruling,  de-listing  decisions  must  be
implemented in such a way that they guarantee the effective
and complete protection of data subjects'  rights and that EU
law cannot be circumvented.
In that sense, limiting de-listing to EU domains on the grounds
that  users  tend  to  access  search  engines  via  their  national
domains  cannot  be  considered  a  sufficient  means  to
satisfactorily guarantee the rights of data subjects according to
the ruling.  In practice,  this means that in  any case de-listing
should  also  be  effective  on  all  relevant  domains,  including
.com.
Thus, the message is clear: the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party
wants global blocking so as to ensure that EU law is not ‘circumvented’. The
question is of course whether blocking on the .com domain will be enough
to achieve this.
The reasoning behind blocking on the global .com domain is that it  is
easy for people to use google.com to access content blocked on a country-
specific search such as google.es – the Spanish domain.
But, if content is blocked also on google.com, will not people who are
sufficiently motivated to search for the content simply use another country-
specific search such as google.com.au?
After all, doing so only requires the pressing of three extra keys – ‘.au’.
Will this reasoning then mean that to comply with EU law, search engines
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need to block search results all over the world? Where do we pull the brake
and say enough is enough?
The Article 29 Data Protection Working Party’s attempt to impose global
blocking  based  on  local  values  should  not  be  seen  in  isolation.  Other
countries are doing exactly the same thing. For example, the US is doing so
in Garcia v. Google, Inc., 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Cir. 2014), amended by Garcia v.
Google,  Inc.,  No.  12-57302,  2014  WL  3377343  (9th  Cir.  July  11,  2014)
(Svantesson 2014a),  and Canada does so in  Equustek Solutions Inc  v.  Jack,
2014 BCSC 1063 (Svantesson 2014b).
This  attitude  may  be  seen  as  natural  and  may  even  be  viewed  as
necessary by some; after all, the most effective way to ensure that content
cannot be accessed is through global blocking. But the problems caused by
this attitude abound.
Most importantly, if our standard position is global blocking based on
our local laws, we can hardly object to other countries doing the same. So
when oppressive dictatorships seek global removal of content offensive to
their  laws,  supporters  of  the Article  29  Data Protection  Working  Party’s
Guidelines can hardly protest based on the effect such removal may have in
open tolerant and democratic states.
The reality is that the trend of states demanding global blocking based
on local laws will inevitably lead to the destruction of a common resource –
the Internet as we know it. What would be left online if anything that may
be unlawful somewhere in the world was removed globally?
Addressing this trend may be both the biggest, and the most important,
challenge for Internet regulation today.
5. BIG DATA – DOES SIZE REALLY MATTER?
The most interesting current and future development in the data privacy
sphere is no doubt the development of Big Data and the Internet of Things.
Information and communication  technologies,  or  ICT,  make possible  the
collection,  storage,  use  and  distribution  of  data  on  a  previously
unimaginable scale. And with increasing storage and processing power in
ever smaller devices, combined with increased connection speeds, it can be
anticipated  that  data  collection,  storage,  use  and  distribution  will  only
continue to increase.
Lately, ‘Big Data’ has become a term of art referring to ‘novel ways in
which  organisations,  including  government  and  businesses,  combine
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diverse  digital  datasets  and  then  use  statistics  and  other  data  mining
techniques to extract  from them both hidden information and surprising
correlations’ (Rubinstein 2013, p. 74). 
Just how large quantities of data we are dealing with is clear from the
below:
The  Economist reports in its 2012 Outlook that the quantity of
global digital data expanded from 130 exabytes in 2005 to 1,227
in  2010,  and  is  predicted  to  rise  to  7,910  exabytes  in  2015.
[internal footnote omitted].
An  exabyte  is  a  quintillion  bytes.  If  you  find  that  hard  to
visualize,  consider  this:  someone  has  calculated  that  if  you
loaded an exabyte of data on to DVDs in slimline jewel cases,
and then loaded them into Boeing 747 aircraft, it would take
13,513 planes to transport one exabyte of data. Using DVDs to
move the data collected globally in 2010 would require a fleet
of more than 16 million jumbo jets (Kuner et al. 2012).
Where large quantities of data are being stored, such collections may,
depending on the type of data,  become ‘honey pots’  targeted by parties
wanting to gain access to the data in question. Typical examples of honey
pots include  databases  that  include credit  card information,  user  details,
passwords etc. In other words, size is a problem in itself when it comes to
data management,  and perhaps it  could be  said  that  the larger  the data
collection the more attractive it is to third parties and, therefore, the more at
risk it is.
Leaving aside the ‘honey pot’ issue, one key privacy issue with Big Data
is neatly described in a paper released by the White House: ‘Computational
capabilities now make “finding a needle in a haystack” not only possible,
but practical. [...] A key privacy challenge in this model of discovery is that
in order to find the needle, you have to have a haystack. To obtain certain
insights,  you  need  a  certain  quantity  of  data’  (Executive  Office  of  the
President 2014, p. 6-7).
And  related  to  this  we  can  identify  another  important  data  privacy
consideration:
The data clusters and relationships revealed in large data sets
can be  unexpected but  deliver  incisive  results.  On the  other
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hand, even with lots of data, the information revealed by big
data  analysis  isn’t  necessarily  perfect.  Identifying  a  pattern
doesn’t  establish  whether  that  pattern  is  significant.
Correlation still doesn’t equal causation. Finding a correlation
with big data techniques may not be an appropriate basis for
predicting outcomes or behavior, or rendering judgments on
individuals.  In  big  data,  as  with  all  data,  interpretation  is
always important (Executive Office of the President 2014, p. 7).
Put  simply,  decision-making  based  on  Big  Data  may  be  a  recipe  for
misguided, unfair and discriminatory outcomes.
A  development  related  to  the  Big  Data  revolution  is  the  so-called
Internet of Things:
The ‘Internet of Things’ is a term used to describe the ability of
devices  to  communicate  with  each  other  using  embedded
sensors that are linked through wired and wireless networks.
These devices could include your thermostat, your car, or a pill
you  swallow  so  the  doctor  can  monitor  the  health  of  your
digestive  tract.  These  connected  devices  use  the  Internet  to
transmit,  compile,  and analyze data (Executive  Office  of  the
President 2014, p. 2).
I will not discuss the Internet of Things in detail. It suffices to note that
when even your toaster, washing machine and your own body are spying
on  you,  protecting  privacy  will  be  even  more  difficult,  and  even  more
important.
6.  THE  FAIRYTALE  CONCEPT  OF  ‘CONSENT’  VS.  A
‘NANNY STATE’ APPROACH 
Most of us can probably agree upon some suitable definition of the concept
of  ‘consent’.  Our  definition  would  probably  refer  to  things  like  consent
being given in some identifiable form, that it be sufficiently informed and
given freely. And in some legal areas the concept makes sense and fills a
function. However, I am afraid that data privacy is not such an area.
In fact, as far as data privacy is concerned, ‘consent’ is, as I (2012) have
been arguing for some years, quite simply a fairytale concept. Thus, the fact
that we can describe, define and delineate what we mean by consent does
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not make it any more real than unicorns and mermaids – those things can
also be described, but we all know they are not real.
So why this skepticism towards consent? Well, the reality is that people
give their consent to so many different things on a daily basis without any
real consideration. Is consent informed when you click ‘I agree’ to a 50-page
legal document just to access a certain website? And is consent given freely
when you agree to the terms of use for software you necessarily need to
function in the workforce? The obvious answer to both these questions is,
‘No’.
I  am  by  no  means  alone  in  my  skepticism  towards  the  concept  of
‘consent’. In fact, nothing I have said above is particularly controversial. The
problem, and the reason why we still rely on consent, is that it is difficult to
think  of  an  alternative  to  relying  on  consent.  Here  I  will  canvass  one
possible, be as it may a not entirely attractive, alternative.
One possibility is that we move towards what in derogatory terms could
be referred to as ‘nanny state data protection’. Despite the negative term,
such an alternative may not be all bad, and inspiration could be drawn from
the EU Directive on unfair contracts terms from 1993. The approach taken in
that Directive could be seen as a step away from party autonomy and self-
determination in that, whatever may be the genuine wishes of the parties, it
prevents  certain  types  of  contract  terms  from  being  included  in  certain
types of contracts under certain conditions.
One can easily picture a similar ‘nanny state’ approach in data privacy
law, which would mark a departure from a largely consent-based paradigm
of  informational  self-determination.  The  advantages  are  obvious.  For
example, if the rules in question are carefully drafted, they may provide a
clearer guidance for businesses and other organisations handling personal
data. Further, and most importantly, we would no longer need to rely on
the fairytale like notion of ‘genuine consent’.
7. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the above, I have sought to draw attention to a selection of legal issues
that arise in the context of data privacy. Had my intention been to paint
some  sort  of  coherent  picture,  the  above  would  have  been  an  obvious
failure.  Fortunately,  I  had  no  such  grand  aims.  However,  in  bringing
attention to the need for Europe to broaden its perspective to take account,
to a greater extent than presently is the case, of what goes on in the data
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privacy landscape around the world, I hope to have achieved something of
value. And in discussing the significance of the extraterritoriality of data
privacy law, I hope (perhaps in vain) to bring attention to the danger of the
path the EU is taking. Further, perhaps what is said above about the right to
be forgotten, big data and the Internet of things can be of some interest. 
So what does the future hold for data privacy? The only thing that is
clear is that data privacy is not a fad that will go away any time soon. I have
no doubt the debate about data privacy will intensify rather than die down.
And wherever that debate takes us, we need to remember that data privacy
is a fundamental human right. It is then not good enough to conclude that
privacy is dying, dead or, indeed, a zombie.
To  say  that  we  do  not  need  a  right  of  privacy  because  our  modern
information society does not cater for privacy is akin to saying that we do
not need a right to water in a desert – the removal of a fundamental right is
justified  by  reference  to  the  environment  being  hostile  to,  or  making
difficult the exercise of, such a right. Such reasoning is clearly flawed and
the opposite is clearly correct – the right to water is much more relevant in a
desert than in a champagne bar in Paris. Similarly, the right to privacy is
more important  in  our current privacy-hostile  technological  environment
than it ever has been before. 
In light of this, data privacy – the ‘ugly duckling’ of the human rights –
is  more likely to continue to develop in importance than it  is  to become
irrelevant. 
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